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The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion 
COLIN P. MARKS
*
 
Irony is defined as “the use of words to express something other than and 
especially the opposite of the literal meaning.”1 Though many other definitions of 
the word exist, in light of the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, this definition comes to mind. Read broadly, the decision 
strikes a blow to the ability of consumers to bring suits against companies, both 
inside and outside of arbitration. But that was not the intent behind the federal act 
that the Court relied upon to justify its decision. 
In 1925, when Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), its intended 
purpose was to promote enforcement of arbitration clauses.
2
 Congress did not 
sweep away all state-created defenses to contract, however; quite the contrary, 
Congress inserted a savings clause that arbitration provisions, like any other 
contract, could be stricken “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity . . . .”3 It 
was upon this basis that the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision to strike down a clause 
in an agreement between AT&T and the Concepcions that required not only that 
the Concepcions submit all disputes to arbitration, but also forbade them from 
forming a class within that arbitration. The Ninth Circuit held that under California 
law, such clauses in take it or leave it contracts, as the one presented to the 
Concepcions, are unconscionable and unenforceable.
4
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, AT&T argued that the FAA preempted the 
unconscionability finding despite the savings clause, as California law 
discriminated against arbitration clauses in violation of the FAA.
5
 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, agreed that the unconscionability finding under California 
law was preempted by the FAA.
6
 In overruling the Ninth Circuit, he repeated the 
theme of needing to promote arbitration. Throughout the majority opinion, he 
introduced, as a corollary, the desire to promote expedited resolution of disputes.
7
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 1. Irony—Definition and More, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/irony. 
 2. See United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883, 883–86 (1925) 
(current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006)) (commonly referred to as the “Federal 
Arbitration Act”). 
 3. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 4. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 5. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
 6. Id. at 1753.  
 7. See id. at 1748–49. 
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However, the majority opinion is itself open to multiple interpretations. Read 
narrowly, the opinion may do nothing more than restate the already established 
principle that states cannot strike down arbitration clauses simply by virtue of their 
existence. If this is true, then unconscionability may still offer parties a way to 
avoid arbitration clauses. But the decision can also be read much more broadly. A 
broad reading of the opinion suggests that any attempt by a court or state legislature 
to limit the method and means of arbitration in a way inconsistent with what 
Congress envisioned is preempted by the FAA. In Concepcion, this meant that an 
attempt by the California courts to force parties to permit class action arbitrations 
despite contractual provisions to the contrary was in violation of the FAA because 
Congress intended to promote bilateral arbitrations.
8
 Thus, according to the 
majority opinion, Congress’s desire to promote bilateral arbitrations preempted the 
California courts’ rulings that clauses limiting the ability to form class actions are 
unconscionable. 
And therein lies the irony.  
If the opinion is read broadly, in striking down the defense of unconscionability 
to class action waivers as inconsistent with the purposes of the FAA, the majority 
opinion, in effect, denies a large swath of individuals the realistic opportunity to 
ever bring their claims, in arbitration or otherwise. In the aftermath of this decision, 
every corporation will be inserting class action waivers into their arbitration clauses 
(if they have not already), and may be emboldened to go much further. Thus, while 
the majority opinion cites, as the reason for its decision, to a broad policy of 
encouraging arbitration and the expeditious resolution of disputes, the effect will be 
quite the opposite.  
This Essay explores the possible dual readings of Concepcion in light of the 
FAA and its interpretation, including Supreme Court precedents. Part I briefly 
discusses the development and scope of the FAA. Part II delves into the use of 
voidability defenses in arbitration clauses under state law doctrines with particular 
emphasis on unconscionability and also explores the Supreme Court’s recent 
jurisprudence on the issue of the appropriateness of class actions in arbitrations. 
Part III dissects the Concepcion decision, putting forth both the narrow and broad 
interpretation of the ruling. This Essay concludes that although there is support for 
interpreting the Concepcion decision narrowly, it is more likely that a broader 
interpretation was intended. However, the metes and bounds of this opinion have 
yet to be explored. Nonetheless, under this broad interpretation, the effect on 
consumers will be to discourage individuals from seeking redress for their claims. 
The decision may actually encourage businesses to breach contractual obligations 
with impunity when the individual sums owed are too small to justify—in the mind 
of a reasonable consumer—the time and effort to seek a remedy. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See id. at 1753. 
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I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND ITS SCOPE 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was passed by Congress in 1925 as a 
reaction to what was seen as judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements.
9
 The 
Act reads, in relevant part, that: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the 
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.
10
 
Prior to the FAA’s passage, it was common for predispute arbitration clauses to be 
struck down on various grounds, including public policy.
11
 The Supreme Court 
determined it was Congress’s intent “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility 
to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements on the same 
footing as other contracts.”12 Despite evidence that the FAA was originally 
envisioned to only encompass claims involving sophisticated parties of equal 
bargaining power,
13
 the Supreme Court has held that the FAA is to be interpreted 
broadly to cover a number of different contractual contexts and claims in 
preemption of state law.
14
 The Court has also held that the FAA applies in state as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. E.g., id. at 1745.  
 10. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 11. E.g., Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Rel. of Kan., 267 U.S. 552, 564–
69 (1925) (striking down a compulsory arbitration claim as a violation of due process); Ins. 
Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1874) (finding that an arbitration clause preempts an 
individual’s constitutional right to have his matter heard in court and discussing numerous 
other cases that also invalidated contracts calling for arbitration), recognized as overruled by 
statute, Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Kenneth 
F. Dunham, Sailing Around Erie: The Emergence of a Federal General Common Law of 
Arbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197, 202–07 (2006) (providing a detailed history of 
arbitration prior to the passage of the 1925 Act). 
 12. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (quoting Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)). 
 13. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 729–30 (2001) 
(stating that the Act’s legislative history evidences an intention that the FAA apply to 
sophisticated parties rather than to contracts of adhesion in contexts such as employment or 
insurance contracts); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against 
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreement Between Employers and Employees, 64 
UMKC L. REV. 449, 466 (1996). But see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver 
Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 167, 179–80 & n.76 (2004) (arguing that despite comments made in the legislative 
history regarding concerns over application of the FAA to contexts involving contracts of 
adhesion, these concerns never made their way into the statute). 
 14. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11, 16 (1984) (finding that the FAA is 
not limited on state grounds past that language contained in § 2); Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
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well as in federal courts.
15
 Thus, courts have held that the FAA preempts 
countervailing state law in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses in a number of 
settings, including employment contracts and consumer contracts.
16
 
In particular, the FAA prevents state legislatures and the judiciary from creating 
special rules limiting the effect of, or striking down, arbitration clauses with rules 
that are only applicable to arbitration clauses. The Supreme Court made this clear 
in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, a case involving a franchise dispute over a 
Subway sandwich shop.
17
 The plaintiff, Paul Casarotto, sued the national franchisor 
of Subway, Doctor’s Associates, Inc. (DAI), alleging state-law contract and tort 
claims involving a franchise agreement between the two.
18
 The franchise agreement 
contained an arbitration clause, so DAI moved to stay the litigation pending 
arbitration.
19
 Though the trial court granted the stay, the Montana Supreme Court 
reversed, finding that the arbitration clause violated a state statute requiring that 
such clauses be printed on the first page of the agreement and written in underlined 
capital letters. Though the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged § 2 of the FAA, 
it felt there was no preemption problem as striking the clause did not undermine the 
goals of the FAA; that is, the Montana law did not preclude arbitration agreements 
altogether.
20
 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
21
 Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the majority, acknowledged that generally applicable contract defenses, 
such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability were still available to invalidate 
arbitration clauses, but state laws could not single out arbitration provisions for 
special treatment.
22
 “By enacting § 2, we have several times said, Congress 
precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, 
requiring instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as other 
contracts.’”23 As the statute at issue was only applicable to arbitration clauses, the 
Court held the statute was preempted by the FAA, noting that the goals of the FAA 
“are antithetical to threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on 
arbitration provisions.”24 
                                                                                                                 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“[9 U.S.C.] Section 2 is a 
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”).  
 15. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12. 
 16. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27–28 (1991) 
(holding that claims under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act and state 
discrimination laws are subject to arbitration clauses); Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 
537 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that arbitration clauses in employee contracts are 
valid when governed by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 
Act of 1994 and by applicable state law); Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 
F.3d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 2005) (overruling state law and subjecting an employment contract to 
the FAA). 
 17. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 684. 
 21. Id. at 689. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 687 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). 
 24. Id. at 688. 
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II. THE SURVIVAL OF UNCONSCIONABILITY WITH REGARD TO  
CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 
Despite the broad policy in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses under the 
FAA, § 2 provides a savings clause for state common law voidability defenses. 
Section 2 states generally that arbitration clauses will be enforceable, “save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”25 As 
noted above, these defenses cannot be tailored to just arbitration clauses. But if the 
same standards are applied to an arbitration clause as would be applied to a contract 
in general, then a defense such as fraud or unconscionability will stand. However, 
to avoid the arbitration provision, the defense must apply to the arbitration 
provision itself and not refer to the overall contract.
26
 For example, if a party were 
to allege that he or she fraudulently was induced into entering into the agreement, it 
is not enough to allege that the fraud induced the party into entering into the entire 
contract; the fraud must be the inducement to agreeing to the arbitration clause for 
the court to adjudicate.
27
 
One of the most common defenses brought to avoid the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses has been unconscionability.
28
 A basic test for unconscionability 
has been set out under the comments to the Uniform Commercial Code as follows: 
[W]hether, in the light of the general commercial background and the 
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved 
are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances 
existing at the time of the making of the contract . . . . The principle is 
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not of 
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining 
power.
29
 
Most courts generally apply the framework described by Professor Arthur Leff that 
unconscionability can be either procedural or substantive, with many courts 
requiring a showing of both.
30
 Despite this formulation, many courts will apply a 
sliding scale to these elements that will forgive a weak showing of one aspect of 
unconscionability if a stronger showing of the other is made.
31
 For instance, a weak 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 26. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444–45 (2006); Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 412–14 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
 27. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 412–14. 
 28. See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Towards Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–95 (2004); see also Stephen A. Broome, An 
Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts 
Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 44–49 (2006) 
(focusing on the defense of unconscionability in California). 
 29. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2004). 
 30. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 488 (1967). 
 31. John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 
931, 950 (1969); see also Terry F. Moritz & Brandon J. Fitch, The Future of Consumer 
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showing of procedural unconscionability, such as when there is only evidence of a 
contract of adhesion and nothing more, could be forgiven if there is a strong 
showing of substantive unconscionability.
32
 As one commentator has noted, 
because of the open-ended nature of unconscionability doctrine, it gives judges “the 
power to hold, as a matter of common law, that a particular agreement is one-sided, 
oppressive, and unfair . . . and thus the power to circumvent the Federal Arbitration 
Act.”33 
Unconscionability has been used to successfully defeat arbitration clauses in a 
number of contexts, including imposing excessive costs on one party so as to limit 
a party’s access to an arbitral forum,34 limiting damages,35 selecting forums,36 
requiring confidentiality,
37
 and limiting the ability of a party to form a class.
38
 As to 
the last of these, limitations on forming a class, some jurisdictions have permitted 
such arbitration clauses if statutes provided for the recovery of attorney’s fees and 
if there was a likelihood of recovering such fees.
39
 California, however, has taken a 
more hostile approach to such clauses. 
                                                                                                                 
Arbitration in Light of Stolt-Nielsen, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 265, 281–82 (2011) 
(describing California law). 
 32. Spanogle, supra note 31, at 950. 
 33. Randall, supra note 28, at 194. 
 34. Id. at 198–99; Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 
(10th Cir. 1999) (finding that a fee splitting provision caused the arbitration agreement to be 
unconscionable and deprived the plaintiff of the ability to successfully adjudicate a statutory 
claim).  
 35. Randall, supra note 28, at 210–11. Although the Supreme Court has not determined 
that the inability to collect punitive damages is unconscionable several state courts have 
upheld the proposition. Id. 
 36. Id. at 214–16. While Forum Selection Clauses are presumed to be valid under 
Supreme Court precedents, courts have refused to uphold them in arbitration agreements 
when the application of law would limit the ability of consumers to argue their claim. See 
id.; see also America Online, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 707–08 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) (stating that upholding a contract’s forum selection clause would violate 
California’s public policy by undermining consumer protection laws). 
 37. Pokorny v. Quixtar, 601 F.3d 987, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2010); Randall, supra note 28, 
at 218–19. 
 38. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 864 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 39. See Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 555–56 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding a 
class-action waiver, in part because the relevant Missouri statute permitted an award of 
attorney’s fees); Dale v. Comcast Corp. 498 F.3d 1216, 1221–24 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that because attorney’s fees were either not available or not likely to be awarded under the 
federal and state law at issue, a class-action waiver was unconscionable). The Dale court 
distinguished a previous case decided under Georgia law, Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace 
Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005), as its enforcement of a class-action waiver involved 
statutes which mandated reasonable attorney’s fees. Id.; see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 
446 F.3d 25, 58, 61–63 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that, due to the likelihood that any award of 
attorney’s fees on an individual claim would be inadequate, a class-action waiver clause was 
unconscionable, as a consumer would not sue at all unless part of a class); Gordon v. Branch 
Banking & Trust Co., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (applying Georgia law 
and holding arbitration clause unconscionable when an award of attorney’s fees was unlikely 
under the statute at issue); cf. Woods v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 97–98 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2008) (holding that an arbitration class-action waiver was unconscionable under 
Missouri law when, though attorney’s fees were available, it was unlikely that an attorney 
would take the case absent the ability to aggregate claims); see also Jean R. Sternlight, As 
2012] THE IRONY OF AT&T v. CONCEPCION 37 
 
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court considered 
the use of class-action waivers in the context of an arbitration agreement.
40
 The 
contract in dispute in Discover Bank involved the assessment of late fees under a 
credit card agreement.
41
 The fees at issue were small as to each individual but large 
in the aggregate, so the plaintiffs sought to form a class action under California 
state law.
42
 The cardholder agreements contained arbitration clauses that forbade 
the claimants from suing in a class-wide arbitration, so the defendant, Discover 
Bank, sought to compel arbitration.
43
 Though the trial court struck the class-action 
waiver as unconscionable, the appellate court reversed, holding that the agreement 
was preempted by the FAA and thus could not be struck down by a rule that 
singled out for special treatment an arbitration provision.
44
 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court first noted that, under some 
circumstances, California state courts had found class-action waivers to be 
unconscionable both inside and outside of the arbitration context.
45
 It then turned to 
the issue at hand and found that a class-action waiver could in fact be 
unconscionable given the right circumstances, stating:  
[W]hen the [class] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion 
in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties 
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged 
that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
                                                                                                                 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 106 (2000) (“In general, clauses which deprive claimants of 
adequate access to a forum, or which deny claimants relief to which they would ordinarily be 
entitled are among those provisions courts are most likely to strike down as unconscionable. 
Applying a similar analysis, courts should find unconscionable those arbitration clauses 
which, by precluding plaintiffs from joining together in a class action, effectively deny 
plaintiffs the opportunity to present their claims in any judicial or arbitral forum.” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
 40. Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1103–04. 
 44. Id. at 1104–05. 
 45. Id. at 1106–07 (discussing America Online, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) and Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002)). The America Online case involved class-action consumer claims that the internet 
provider continued to charge monthly fees to subscribers subsequent to contract termination. 
108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702. America Online moved for a dismissal of the suit due to the 
Subscriber Agreement’s Terms of Service, which stated that all claims were subject to 
jurisdiction in Virginia and also included a choice of law provision that stated Virginia law 
governed all suits. Id. at 702–03. The court of appeals found that the forum selection clause 
in the agreement was void as against public policy, as it would have the effect of stripping 
the consumers of their ability to file a class action. Id. at 702. In Szetela, the validity of class-
action waivers in the context of arbitration was at issue. Discover had amended its 
cardmember agreements in 1999, notifying customers, via statement insert, that if either 
party elected to handle a dispute through arbitration, the other would be bound to do so. 
Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864. The only alternative offered to cardholders was 
cancellation of their account. Id. The court considered both the procedural and substantive 
unconscionability and determined that the prohibition of class actions as part of the 
arbitration clause was unconscionable. Id. at 867–68. 
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individually small sums of money, then, at least . . . the waiver becomes 
in practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its] own 
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.” Under 
these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California 
law and should not be enforced.
46
 
The Court premised this statement, however, with the caveat that it was not 
holding that all class-action waivers were per se unconscionable.
47
 The Discover 
Bank rule has been articulated as having three components:  
(1) is the agreement a contract of adhesion; (2) are disputes between the 
contracting parties likely to involve small amounts of damages; and (3) 
is it alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has carried 
out a scheme deliberately to cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money.
48
 
After laying out a framework to find whether class-action waivers are 
unconscionable, the California Supreme Court then addressed the possible FAA 
preemption issue.
49
 The court held that it was not preempted as the rule it 
articulated did not require special scrutiny simply because it involved an arbitration 
agreement.
50
 Distinguishing the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry v. 
Thomas, the Discover Bank court noted, “In the present case, the principle that 
class-action waivers are, under certain circumstances, unconscionable as unlawfully 
exculpatory is a principle of California law that does not specifically apply to 
arbitration agreements, but to contracts generally.”51 The court thus remanded the 
issue to the appellate court for further findings.
52
 But if it was the California 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that no per se rule regarding class-action waivers in an 
arbitration agreement had been created, this was not necessarily how the Court in 
Concepcion viewed the rule.
53
 
Though the Supreme Court of the United States had not addressed the Discover 
Bank rule prior to Concepcion,
54
 it had expressed its view of the appropriateness of 
limiting class-action arbitrations under the FAA in the Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (last alteration in original) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 47. See id. 
 48. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Shroyer v. 
New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2007)), rev’d sub nom. 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 49. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. 
 50. See id. at 1112. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1118. Interestingly, the court did not resolve the issue but instead remanded 
for a determination as to whether a choice-of-law provision applying Delaware law should 
be applied; the application of Delaware law would likely have resulted in upholding the 
class-action waiver. Id. at 1117. 
 53. See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 54. Indeed, the Court in Concepcion noted that it has had “little occasion to examine 
classwide arbitration.” AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). 
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AnimalFeeds International Corp. decision
55
 (which the Court subsequently cited in 
support of its Concepcion holding).
56
 In Stolt-Nielsen, a group of shipping parties 
were sued by AnimalFeeds International Corporation (“AnimalFeeds”) in a 
putative class action for antitrust violations.
57
 Post dispute, the parties agreed to 
submit to a panel of arbitrators the issue of whether their charter agreement, which 
contained an arbitration clause but was silent on the issue of class actions, would 
permit such an action to be brought.
58
 The panel determined that the arbitration 
clause permitted class actions, and the shipping parties then sought to vacate the 
decision in the district court for the Southern District of New York.
59
 The district 
court vacated the panel’s award finding it was in “manifest disregard” of the law, 
but the Second Circuit reversed.
60
 
In its decision, the Supreme Court first noted that AnimalFeeds had put forward 
before the arbitration panel three arguments explaining why a class action should 
be permitted:  
(a) the [arbitration] clause is silent on the issue of class treatment and, 
without express prohibition, class arbitration is permitted under 
[Supreme Court precedent]; (b) the clause should be construed to 
permit class arbitration as a matter of public policy; and (c) the clause 
would be unconscionable and unenforceable if it forbade class 
arbitration.
61
  
The panel rejected the first argument and never addressed the third regarding 
unconscionability,
62
 so only the second issue was before the Court. The Court then 
held that the panel had exceeded its authority in that it created a common law 
default rule based upon its best judgment rather than on the policy considerations 
of, among other things, the FAA.
63
 The Court then cited to the fundamental concept 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 56. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750. Another decision, worth mentioning briefly, though 
it was not at issue in Concepcion, is Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 
(2010). Rent-A-Center involved an employment arbitration agreement which also provided 
that an arbitrator would have the “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the 
interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation” of the arbitration agreement. 130 S. 
Ct. at 2775. This delegation clause included issues of voidability such as unconscionability. 
Id. Though the Court recognized that courts may decide issues of voidability as to an 
arbitration provision, it held this power can freely be delegated to an arbitrator and such an 
agreement to arbitrate stands on equal footing with other contracts. Id. at 2778–79. Though 
Jackson claimed the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, his claim was with regard to 
the underlying arbitration agreement and not the delegation provision. Id. at 2779. Thus the 
Court held that had Jackson wished to have a court, rather than an arbitrator, decide the issue 
of unconscionability of the arbitration provision, he would first have to convince a court that 
the delegation provision itself was void, for instance because it was unconscionable. Id. 
 57. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764–65. 
 58. Id. at 1765. 
 59. Id. at 1766. 
 60. Id. at 1766–67. 
 61. Id. at 1768 (quoting AnimalFeeds’ memorandum of law filed with the arbitration 
panel) (emphasis omitted). 
 62. Id. This third ground would have more directly impacted the Concepcion decision. 
 63. Id. at 1768–69. 
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that arbitration clauses should be enforced according to their terms.
64
 As the 
agreement was silent on the issue of class actions, the Court determined that class 
actions should only be permitted if the parties agreed to do so, and, absent express 
agreement, the context of the agreement would have to justify inferring such an 
agreement.
65
 But the Court held that, given the nature of arbitration, the panel could 
not infer an agreement to allow class actions to proceed.
66
 As the Court noted: 
This is so because class-action arbitration changes the nature of 
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties 
consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an 
arbitrator. In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and 
appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private 
dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the 
ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.
67
 
Given the fundamental differences between bilateral and class arbitration, the Court 
reasoned that silence on the issue could not be interpreted to presume consent to 
class-action arbitrations.
68
 Thus, though the decision did not impact 
unconscionability as it relates to class-action waivers, the decision set the table for 
the policy concerns that would play out again in Concepcion. 
III. AT&T V. CONCEPCION 
The facts of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion involve the purchase of a cell 
phone and a service agreement, under which the Concepcions were promised a 
“free” phone.69 Unfortunately for the Concepcions, the phones were not truly free, 
as they were still required to pay the taxes on the phone based on the retail value—
a sum of $30.22.
70
 The Concepcions filed suit against AT&T, and their case was 
consolidated into a class action alleging that AT&T had committed fraud and had 
engaged in false advertising in connection with the sale of the phones and service 
plans.
71
 The agreement that the Concepcions had entered into contained an 
arbitration clause that not only compelled the Concepcions to bring their claim in 
an arbitration proceeding, but also required that they do so only in their individual 
capacity and not as a member of a class.
72
 
In accordance with the provisions of the agreement, AT&T moved to compel 
arbitration.
73
 The district court denied the motion, finding that the class-action 
waiver was unconscionable in accordance with the California Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. Id. at 1773. 
 65. See id. at 1775. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1776. 
 69. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).  
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Discover Bank opinion.
74
 In doing so, the district court noted that in many other 
respects, the arbitration clause was fair to individual consumers like the 
Concepcions; nonetheless, the court was compelled to find the clause 
unconscionable under California precedent.
75
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, finding that Discover Bank was not preempted by the FAA because it was 
a rule of general applicability to all contracts and not just those with arbitration 
clauses.
76
 AT&T thus appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Writing for the five-member majority,
77
 Justice Scalia first acknowledged that 
defenses such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability survived preemption under § 
2 of the FAA.
78
 He then reiterated the Discover Bank rule and framed the issue 
before the Court as “whether § 2 preempts California’s rule classifying most 
collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”79 In 
answering this question, the Court first noted that unlike a straightforward state rule 
that prohibits arbitration of a type of claim, the question before it was more 
complex in that the Discover Bank rule purported to be generally applicable, but in 
effect disfavors arbitration.
80
 To illustrate the ruling, the Court hypothesized that an 
arbitration provision could be struck by a state court as unconscionable because it 
does not allow judicially monitored discovery, does not abide by the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, or disallows a panel consisting of anything other than twelve lay 
arbitrators.
81
 Though such rules could appear facially neutral, their effects would 
clearly discriminate against arbitration, as requirements such as a twelve lay 
arbitrator panel would be counter to the essential nature of arbitration. Thus, 
despite the facially neutral appearance of such rules, the Court held that § 2 does 
not suggest “an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”82 Building upon this line of reasoning, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. Id. at 1745; see also Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167, 2008 WL 
5216255, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).  
 75. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745; see also Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11–12. 
 76. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 77. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740. Though Justice Thomas signed on with the 
majority, he wrote a separate concurrence in which he articulated his view that the FAA 
savings clause only applies to defenses regarding the formation of the arbitration agreement 
and not the substance of the agreement. Id. at 1754–55 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice 
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1755. Justice Thomas, therefore, would have found for AT&T simply on the ground that the 
Discover Bank rule is not a defense that is available under the FAA. Id. Justice Thomas’s 
focus, though couched in terms of public policy, could be read as a broad-based attack on 
unconscionability claims in general. Conspicuously absent from his list of defenses available 
under the savings clause was unconscionability. See id. (listing fraud, duress, and mutual 
mistake, but not unconscionability). However, if this is true, it appears to be based on 
substantive unconscionability claims, though he makes no reference to the classic conception 
of unconscionability, which includes the dual prongs of substantive and procedural 
unconscionability. 
 78. Id. at 1746 (majority opinion). 
 79. Id.  
 80. See id. at 1747. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1748. 
42 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT [Vol. 87:31 
 
Justice Scalia then explored the “principal purpose” of the FAA, which is to 
“‘ensur[e] that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’”83 As 
a corollary to this purpose, the Court also noted that, to the extent the two purposes 
were not in conflict, the FAA is also meant to encourage the efficient resolution of 
disputes.
84
 
Turning to the Discover Bank rule, the Court first indicated that, in effect, the 
rule would apply to all consumer contracts (given that consumer contracts are, in 
modern times, adhesive) and, it found that the other elements of the rule were so 
easily met as to be “toothless” with no “limiting effect.”85 Given that the Discover 
Bank rule allowed plaintiffs to choose class-wide arbitration ex post, despite the 
terms of the agreement, the Court held that it was counter to the purposes of the 
FAA.
86
 Three justifications for this ruling were then offered, the first two of which 
are just flip sides of the same concept. First, the Court noted that to require class-
action arbitration would be to sacrifice the informality that is a principal advantage 
inherent in arbitration, as class-action arbitration would “make[] the process slower, 
more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”87 
This means that preliminary issues such as class certification, among other things, 
would have to be ruled upon before the merits of the case could be heard.
88
 Indeed, 
the Court noted that by its very nature, class-action arbitration requires procedural 
formality (this was the Court’s second justification which, again, is just the flip side 
of the first). Looking back to the drafters’ intent when the FAA was passed in 1925, 
the Court held that such procedural requirements were not contemplated because 
class-action arbitrations are a recent development.
89
 It therefore follows from this 
conclusion that the Court views arbitration under the FAA as only encouraging 
bilateral arbitration.
90
 Finally, the Court noted that to permit class-action 
arbitrations despite the clear wording of the agreement would place defendants at a 
large disadvantage because the risk of damages without a meaningful review 
process would force settlements of even questionable claims.
91
 On this point, the 
Court concluded, “We find it hard to believe that defendants would bet the 
company with no effective means of review, and even harder to believe that 
Congress would have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.”92 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland 
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IV. TWO POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF CONCEPCION 
While the ultimate conclusion of the majority of the Court in this case is clear, 
the reasoning is still subject to some debate. At least two major interpretations 
seem possible—an “as applied” interpretation, or a “fundamental attributes of 
arbitration” approach. The first interpretation plays upon the framing of the 
question by the Court as “whether § 2 preempts California’s rule classifying most 
collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”93 This 
view is that the Court’s opinion is nothing more than an extension of the rule that 
arbitration agreements cannot be struck down simply by virtue of involving 
arbitration. The broader view, and perhaps the more likely intended interpretation, 
is that Concepcion stands for the proposition that any state-created rule that 
compels an arbitration procedure not in-line with the vision the drafters had of 
arbitration in 1925, is counter to the goals of the FAA and thus preempted. This is 
true both as to rules created by the legislature and the courts, and regardless of 
whether the rules are facially neutral. 
A. The “As Applied” Application of Concepcion 
One possible interpretation of the Concepcion opinion is that it is nothing more 
than an extension of the principle put forward in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, 
and that was further elaborated in later opinions. This principle holds that state laws 
and court-created doctrines may not single out arbitration provisions for different 
treatment. The Court’s opinion at first seemed poised to go down this traditional 
route, framing the question as one of § 2 preemption when a state rule classified 
“most” class-action waivers as unconscionable.94 Under this interpretation, the 
Court merely looked beyond the wording of the Discover Bank rule, which was 
couched in arbitration neutral terms, to its effect on arbitration, drawing 
comparisons to other hypothetical rulings that clearly could only affect arbitration 
agreements.
95
 The Court also strongly indicated that the Discover Bank rule itself 
was, in effect, going to be heavily utilized in the context of arbitrations, given that 
consumer contracts tend to be contracts of adhesion.
96
 Under this interpretation, the 
opinion would do nothing more than signal a further willingness by the Court to 
look at how state-created rules will affect arbitration agreements, regardless of their 
wording. 
However, if this were the case, further discussion of the purposes of the FAA 
would seem unnecessary. Instead of stating that the Discover Bank rule was 
impermissibly singling out arbitration clauses, the Court instead extended its 
analysis to contemplate the effect class-action arbitrations would have on the 
arbitration process. Furthermore, if the Court’s decision were nothing more than an 
extension of the Doctor’s Associates principle, it would follow that an 
unconscionability ruling forbidding class-action waivers on an ad hoc basis could 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. Id. at 1746. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. 08-16080, 2011 WL 3505016, at *4–5 
(11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2011). 
 96. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750. 
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survive Concepcion. Perhaps a more neutrally worded approach, such as one that 
made no distinction between consumer and nonconsumer cases, could still survive 
scrutiny. But the Court, in at least two instances, seemingly negated this possibility, 
stating that “the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA,”97 
and later noting that the Court found it hard to believe Congress intended to allow 
states to force defendants into class arbitrations under the FAA.
98
 
B. The “Fundamental Attributes of Arbitration” Approach 
This leads to what is the more likely intended view of Concepcion, the 
“fundamental attributes of arbitration” approach (or perhaps more accurately the 
violates “fundamental attributes of arbitration” approach). Under this approach, the 
focus is not on whether, on its face, the state is impermissibly treating arbitration 
differently from other procedures. Instead, what is important is the purpose of the 
FAA when it was enacted in 1925 and what characteristics Congress envisioned an 
“arbitration” to have at that time. In Concepcion the Court repeatedly made 
reference to Congress’s intent to promote arbitration agreements,99 promote 
arbitration itself,
100
 and to promote efficiency (though this last aim was secondary 
to the goal of promoting arbitration).
101
 According to the Court, Congress 
envisioned bilateral, rather than class action, arbitrations when it passed the FAA 
(as class-action arbitrations were not even in existence at the time). This position is 
consistent with the purpose of efficiency, as class actions would add an additional 
layer of complexity, thus dragging out the litigation process, which ultimately 
would be inconsistent with the goals of the FAA. Under this interpretation, if a 
state law, or court-made rule, would force parties into a form of arbitration not 
envisioned by Congress when it drafted the FAA, the state law would be 
preempted.
102
 With regard to class-action waivers, this appears to be true regardless 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. Id. at 1748. 
 98. Id. (pointing out that it is unlikely that Congress intended to allow state law to 
“stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”). 
 99. See id. at 1745 (referring to Congress’s focus on encouraging parties to contract for 
arbitration).  
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id. at 1749.  
 101. Id. at 1758.  
 102. Professor Richard Bales has posited that the ruling goes even further, speculating 
that the holding is “boundaryless.” He states: 
The majority, however, found that the Discover Bank rule has the effect of 
discouraging arbitration by increasing the complexity of the dispute-resolution 
process and thereby making arbitration less attractive to the AT&Ts of the 
world. The problem with this argument, as the dissent points out, is that it is 
inconsistent with the text of the statute. It is also boundaryless. What happens 
when AT&T puts a provision in its arbitration agreement forbidding arbitral 
discovery? A provision limiting remedies in employment cases to the lesser of 
actual damages or $500? Striking these clauses would “discourage” arbitration 
by increasing the complexity of arbitration and making arbitration less 
attractive to BigBusiness. Are we on the road to laissez-faire arbitration? 
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of collateral concerns such as attorney’s fees. While the Discover Bank rule at issue 
in Concepcion did not consider the likelihood of attorney’s fees being awarded, 
other courts have considered this as part of their unconscionability analysis. But the 
Supreme Court’s articulated holding does not appear to consider whether attorney’s 
fees are likely to be awarded or not to be relevant. Thus a number of 
unconscionability cases that have relied on such concerns are now called into 
question under Concepcion.
103
 
Beyond the far-reaching impact on class-action waiver clauses, this 
interpretation also leaves some unanswered questions with regard to what Congress 
envisioned as “arbitration” under the FAA. First, it is unclear whether the principle 
put forth by the Court is primarily one of efficiency or one involving the definition 
of arbitration. The examples given by the Court, such as a rule compelling 
judicially monitored discovery, a rule compelling use of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, and a rule compelling a panel of twelve arbitrators, do not illuminate this 
issue. The first two could be viewed as hindering the efficient resolution of a 
dispute, but it is difficult to tell from the opinion why the third one would violate 
this principle. While the extreme examples offered by the Court involve clear 
violations of what a normal arbitration calls for, considering that there is a 
mechanism for class-action arbitrations in place under the AAA,
104
 the class-action 
waiver issue seems to involve a closer case. The Court resolves this by referring to 
the lack of class-action arbitration in 1925, but as the dissent points out, many 
arbitration procedures were not fully developed at that time.
105
 
Thus, while the holding may well hinge upon a state rule that violates the 
“fundamental attributes of arbitration,” the Court has left open the question of what 
these fundamental attributes are. The rule appears to be that any state rule that 
hinders the efficient resolution of disputes could be subject to preemption, but this 
raises the question of in relation to what? The answer appears to be in relation to 
arbitration as envisioned by Congress in 1925, but other than a statement that 
Congress did not envision class-action arbitration, we are left to wonder what the 
metes and bounds of this holding are. 
The case of Dale v. Comcast
106
 provides a good example of how Concepcion 
might affect existing rulings in the class-action arena. Dale involved a class action 
brought by subscribers of Comcast, a cable television provider, who sought to 
recover for unjust enrichment based on alleged violations of the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (“Cable Act”).107 The subscribers were bound 
by arbitration agreements that waived the right to bring class-action claims and 
Comcast successfully argued to the district court that the claim should be arbitrated 
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and that the waiver clause was not unconscionable.
108
 On appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed and remanded.
109
 
In its analysis, the circuit court began by noting that an unconscionability claim 
is appropriately governed by state law and that Georgia law recognized both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability.
110
 Focusing on the substantive 
unconscionability claim only, the court noted that it had previously upheld class-
action waivers in other contexts, but held that it had not created a per se rule that 
every class-action waiver was enforceable under Georgia law.
111
 The court then 
distinguished its previous decisions, in which it had upheld the waivers, on the 
grounds that the previous decisions involved claims “for which attorneys’ fees and 
other costs were recoverable.”112 Unlike those decisions, the case before the court 
did not provide statutorily for attorney’s fees. Turning its eye toward public policy, 
the court held that, without the benefit of bringing a class action, the subscribers 
would effectively be precluded from suing Comcast for a violation of the Cable Act 
provision at issue, noting that “[t]he cost of vindicating an individual subscriber’s 
claim, when compared to his or her potential recovery, is too great.”113 Though the 
subscribers’ cause of action could have potentially resulted in an award of 
attorney’s fees under state law, the court found that the requisite “bad faith” needed 
to recover such an award made it too difficult for the subscribers to obtain 
representation.
114
 The court thus held that the determination of whether a class-
action waiver in an arbitration clause is unconscionable should be conducted on a 
case-by-case basis considering the following circumstances:  
the fairness of the provisions, the cost to an individual plaintiff of 
vindicating the claim when compared to the plaintiff's potential 
recovery, the ability to recover attorneys’ fees and other costs and thus 
obtain legal representation to prosecute the underlying claim, the 
practical affect the waiver will have on a company’s ability to engage 
in unchecked market behavior, and related public policy concerns.
115
 
Under a narrow reading of Concepcion, the Dale decision could perhaps 
survive. Though a relevant concern of the Dale court was the ability to obtain 
representation in an arbitration context, the ruling did not create a broad ruling 
forbidding class-action waivers in arbitration. However, it is possible that even 
under a narrow reading of Concepcion, the decision could come under scrutiny as 
the issue is most likely only going to arise in contract of adhesion contexts, but the 
ruling seems open-ended enough to distinguish it from the Discover Bank rule. 
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But under a broader reading of Concepcion, the Dale decision is under more 
scrutiny. Though the arbitration provision at issue in Concepcion did provide for 
attorney’s fees,116 the Court did not rely on the availability of attorney’s fees in 
striking down the Discover Bank rule. Instead, the Court focused on what Congress 
envisioned as arbitration in 1925—this meant bilateral arbitration. Applying this 
focus on congressional intent to the Dale case, one would have to ask whether 
Congress envisioned parties bearing their own costs as well as accepting the risk 
that the cause of action at issue would not provide for the provision for attorney’s 
fees. Given that focus, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would hold class-
action waivers are only enforceable when attorney’s fees are available either 
statutorily or via the arbitration agreement itself. 
However, there may be a two-pronged method under which decisions such as 
Dale could survive even this broad ruling. First, if the Court’s focus on efficiency is 
the linchpin of the broad interpretation of the decision, then an unconscionability 
ruling regarding the availability of attorney’s fees may survive as it does not affect 
the efficient resolution of a dispute. But for this to work, it must rely on the second 
prong—the focus must be not on whether the class-action waiver is 
unconscionable, but rather on whether the lack of a method to realistically recover 
attorney’s fees is available. If not, then perhaps a court could rule that this failure 
makes the arbitration clause unconscionable given that the claimant is forced into 
bilateral arbitration. The Supreme Court did not develop its discussion of the 
relevancy of the provision for attorney’s fees, and so this appears to remain an open 
question. Nonetheless, decisions such as Dale appear to be susceptible to attack in 
light of Concepcion.
117
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). The Concepcion 
arbitration clause provided that  
AT & T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; . . . ; and that the arbitrator 
may award any form of individual relief, including injunctions and presumably 
punitive damages . . . . The agreement, moreover, denies AT & T any ability to 
seek reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, and, in the event that a customer 
receives an arbitration award greater than AT & T’s last written settlement 
offer, requires AT & T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the 
amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees. 
Id. Though generous at first blush, the agreement really does nothing to encourage 
representation as explained below. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 117. Indeed, in Cruz, the Eleventh Circuit struck down an argument similar to that made 
in Concepcion despite stronger evidence of the effect on the ability of claimants to obtain 
representation, a factor that was relevant in the Dale decision. Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, 
LLC, No. 08–16080, 2011 WL 3505016, at *6 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2011) (“Therefore, to the 
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the ability to retain counsel], and would invalidate the class waiver simply because the 
claims are of small value, the potential claims are numerous, and many consumers might not 
know about or pursue their potential claims absent class procedures, such a state policy 
stands as an obstacle to the FAA’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to 
their terms, and is preempted.”). 
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C. The Impact of Concepcion 
Regardless of the approach, a narrow or broad interpretation, one concept seems 
clear after Concepcion: class-action waivers in arbitration agreements cannot 
themselves be struck down as unconscionable (at least not without additional 
unconscionable facts). Under the “as applied” interpretation, while it is possible 
that a state court or legislature could try to broaden the scope of a rule to make its 
impact more akin to a rule of general applicability, it seems unlikely, given the 
Court’s comments, that such a rule would survive, especially given that such 
waivers are almost always going to come hand-in-hand with arbitration provisions. 
Under the violates “fundamental attributes of arbitration” approach, the prospects 
of striking down class-action waivers is even more bleak as the Court has stated 
that class actions, by their very nature, violate the purpose of the FAA. 
In the short term, under either interpretation, it is likely that companies will 
begin to make class-action waivers a part of every arbitration agreement they enter 
into with consumers, if they do not do so already.
118
 This will, in turn, result in 
consumers being forced to make a choice between disputing perceived breaches 
involving small amounts in an arbitration forum without legal assistance (as the 
financial incentive to represent such a client will be small) or simply to accept the 
loss. Of course, it is predictable that a few individual consumers will pursue the 
arbitration route (certainly fewer than would be represented in a class action). Thus, 
in light of the Court’s repeated references to the FAA’s purpose of promoting 
arbitration, this result is ironic as the effect will be quite the opposite—fewer 
overall disputes will be settled via arbitration. Considering the disputes would have 
been class-action arbitrations, which Justice Scalia’s opinion does not recognize as 
“arbitration” under the FAA, the irony of this situation would likely be lost on the 
Court. 
There is still the option for the consumer to resolve issues by dealing with the 
customer service departments of the individual companies, but without the threat of 
a possible class-action lawsuit, the incentive for companies to resolve issues will be 
diminished. Furthermore, the availability of attorney’s fees may not create an 
adequate incentive for attorneys to represent consumers should they choose to 
pursue their claims in arbitration. For instance, the arbitration provision at issue in 
Concepcion provided that, should the ultimate award be greater than the last 
offered settlement, then the consumer was entitled to an additional $7500 award 
and double its attorney’s fees,119 but realistically, this was no incentive at all with 
such a small dollar claim. Once the Concepcions hired an attorney to represent 
them, AT&T could likely avoid this provision by simply offering the $30.22 at 
issue. The Concepcions would then be faced with the choice to accept the amount 
and pay their own attorney’s fees, or roll the dice in the hopes that relief in an 
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amount greater than $30.22 is awarded. Understandably, this may have a chilling 
effect on the individual consumer as well as on the consumer’s ability to obtain 
representation in the first place. The impact of prohibiting class-action arbitrations 
may very well, in effect, deny the realistic ability of consumers to obtain relief, and 
this is where the decision may have its greatest impact on consumers.
120
 
Assuming companies operate under a theory of efficient breach, it will make 
sense for them to commit breaches that result in small dollar amounts. To illustrate, 
assume ABC, Inc. sells laptop computers with an express warranty. It comes to 
ABC’s attention that a small number of the laptops have a minor defect that affects 
their volume control when certain applications are downloaded. ABC knows that 
fixing the problem will be expensive, and likely will require replacing the laptops. 
The company knows that consumers will think that ABC is required to repair or 
replace the laptops under the terms of the warranty, but knows there is a weak 
argument it can make that the defect is not covered. Instead of attempting to fix all 
of the defective laptops, the company chooses to let consumers try to resolve the 
claim via the customer service department, knowing that many will be discouraged 
by the process. Only if a customer actually files an arbitration claim will ABC 
finally negotiate a settlement in the form of a voucher worth less than the fix 
itself.
121
 Prior to Concepcion, the threat of a class-action suit might have 
encouraged ABC to be more responsive to complaints in order to head off a costly 
lawsuit, perhaps offering a recall of the faulty laptops. After Concepcion, 
companies such as ABC are incentivized, under the right circumstances, to drag out 
a resolution in the hopes of discouraging consumers from pursuing their claims. Of 
course there will always be individuals who are persistent enough to reach a 
resolution, and some breaches may be large enough to warrant wide-scale remedial 
action for fear of the bad publicity. However, relying upon market forces alone to 
encourage resolution invests a lot of faith in the market’s power. 
Beyond the short-term effect on class actions, Concepcion potentially raises 
larger questions about arbitration clauses in general, including how it will affect 
resolution of future unconscionability claims. For instance, a number of courts have 
held that arbitration clauses that impose arbitration fees upon the plaintiff—fees 
that might otherwise discourage the claimant from pursuing a remedy—are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. This line of reasoning has been at the heart of a number of decisions striking down 
class-action waivers in arbitration agreements as unconscionable. For instance, in McKenzie 
v. Betts, 55 So. 3d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), consumer borrowers brought a class-action 
against a lender based upon violations of various Florida statutes for charging usurious rates. 
Id. at 617–18. At issue on appeal was the unconscionability of a class-action waiver. In 
holding the clause unconscionable, the court concluded that, “[b]ecause payday loan cases 
are complex, time-consuming, involve small amounts, and do not guarantee adequate awards 
of attorney’s fees, individual plaintiffs cannot obtain competent counsel without the 
procedural vehicle of a class action. The class-action waiver prevents consumers from 
vindicating their statutory rights, and thus violates public policy.” Id. at 629; see also supra 
note 39 (summarizing similar cases). 
 121. Obviously there will be cases where company ABC will fix the problem regardless 
of warranty obligations, such as when the problem is widespread enough, or harmful enough, 
to cause harm to the company image and possibly hurt sales. This example is intended to fall 
short of such a threshold. 
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unconscionable.
122
 Some courts have found confidentiality agreements 
unconscionable.
123
 If the Court’s focus on arbitration as it existed in 1925 is the 
hallmark of the “fundamental attributes of arbitration” approach, then we must 
engage in a historical guessing game as to what Congress envisioned with regard to 
these issues. With regard to the arbitration fee issue, given the Concepcion Court’s 
concern with expediency, an unconscionability ruling may not be an issue as cost 
shifting would not prolong arbitration (and may encourage it).
124
 But the 
confidentiality issue may be subject to scrutiny as the reference to what Congress 
envisioned as “arbitration” leaves such questions unanswered. 
CONCLUSION 
No reasonable person would hire a lawyer to sue for the sums at issue in 
Concepcion ($30.22), nor would any attorney take the case other than at an hourly 
rate far in excess of the underlying claim. Rather than bring the claims as a class in 
arbitration and have the dispute resolved, individuals will be left unable to bring 
their claims at all. While some may choose to arbitrate the claims themselves 
without the assistance of an attorney, they will face the daunting task of navigating 
the arbitration system on their own. Understandably, many will not find this to be a 
realistic alternative. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Dobbins v. Hawk’s Enters., 198 
F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that arbitration fees can make a contract unconscionable, 
but unconscionability will be determined on a case-by-case basis); State ex rel. Vincent v. 
Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 860 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (“It is unconscionable to have a 
provision in an arbitration clause that puts all fees for arbitration on the consumer.”); Sosa v. 
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996) (concluding that, in a medical malpractice case, the 
requirement for the patient to pay the arbitration fees was unconscionable and contrary to 
public policy). 
 123. See Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
confidentiality clause that precluded mentioning even people not directly involved in 
arbitration proceeding was unconscionable); Sprague v. Household Int’l, 473 F. Supp. 2d 
966 (W.D. Mo. 2005).  
 124. The Court has, in previous opinions, left the door open for the argument that an 
arbitration clause could be invalidated on public policy grounds if it effectively prevents a 
claimant from vindicating a statutory cause of action. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636–37 (1985) (“Where the parties have agreed that 
the arbitral body is to decide a defined set of claims which includes, as in these cases, those 
arising from the application of American antitrust law, the tribunal therefore should be 
bound to decide that dispute in accord with the national law giving rise to the claim . . . . And 
so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in 
the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent 
function.”); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (rejecting 
generalized attacks on arbitration based upon suspicion that it would affect a claimant’s 
rights but noting that such claims “may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, 
the statute serves its functions.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). These cases 
dealt with federal rather than state statutory rights however, and it is an open question 
whether this argument stands post-Concepcion scrutiny. Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 
No. 08–16080, 2011 WL 3505016, at *8 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2011). 
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While the majority would find nothing ironic in its decision,
125
 the irony was not 
lost on the entire Court. As the dissent, authored by Justice Breyer, correctly points 
out, the effect of the decision is not to encourage multiple individual suits for small 
sums, but rather it discourages these suits from ever being brought in the first place. 
Some might argue that with fewer lawsuits being brought, consumers will be 
helped as the cost of doing business for companies goes down and savings will be 
passed onto the consumer public. This assumption ignores the very real possibility 
that the savings will instead be translated into higher compensation packages for 
management or passed along to the shareholders.
126
 
Putting aside the speculative aspect of this argument, it still does not pass muster 
when viewed from the perspective of those that have been wronged. The 
Concepcions were allegedly deceived and suffered damages of $30.22. While the 
sum is small, it is still a very real amount. Unfortunately, the real-life effect of the 
majority’s opinion is to leave the Concepcions, and the greater American public, at 
the whim of a company’s customer services department. It seems unlikely that the 
deterrent effect of such calls will be as great as the threat of a class action or that 
relief will be as easily obtained. In short, though the purpose of the FAA may be to 
promote arbitration and the efficient resolution of disputes, the effect of AT&T v. 
Concepcion is to achieve quite the opposite. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. The Court will find no irony, as it defines arbitration rather narrowly under the FAA 
as envisioning bilateral (i.e., non-class-action) arbitrations. 
 126. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 75, 93–94 (2004), available at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/277/. 
